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Alessandro Zattoni 
THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE  GROUPS: THE ITALIAN CASE 
Large firms all over the world conduct their business through a number (tens or 
hundreds) of subsidiaries  and associated companies, the single company that conducts 
its business without equity ties with other firms is nowadays the legal form adopted only 
by small enterprises. The corporate group is typical not only of developing countries 
such as Nicaragua or India, or of countries of late industrialisation such as Germany and 
Japan,  but it is also the usual legal structure adopted in Anglo-Saxon countries such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom (Strachan, 1976; Chandler, 1982; Goto, 
1982; Encaoua, Jacquemin, 1982; Tricker, 1984; Wymeersch, 1994; etc.)  
There are many reasons why firms adopt this complex structure: to minimise tax 
burdens, to follow the internationalisation process, to isolate the risks involved in 
certain activities or businesses, to take advantage of some legal regulations, and so on 
(Bonbright, Means, 1932; Hadden, 1984; Tricker, 1994; Zattoni, 1997; etc.). Depending 
on the objectives pursued, managers can create separate legal entities to govern single 
functions of the firm (production, sales, R&D, etc.), single businesses (insurance, 
manufacturing, services, etc.) or parts of businesses (products, brands, geographical 
areas, etc.). 
Previous studies show that corporate groups tend to be characterised by company 
structures that differ according to the country of incorporation of the parent companies. 
This means that groups with parent companies located in the same country tend to have 
homogeneous characteristics (organisational isomorphism)1 and that groups located in 
different countries have different features. In other words, the legal, social and cultural 
institutions of the host country seem to have a great influence on company structure. 
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That being said, the main aim of this article is to describe the characteristics of large 
firms in Italy and to analyse the reasons that lead to the adoption of a complex company 
structure. With this aim in mind, the first part of this article will describe the 
characteristics of large Italian firms in terms of structure of control and ratio of shares 
owned by the main shareholder, comparing them with other countries; the second part of 
the article will analyse the typical company structure adopted by large Italian firms, 
explaining the reasons that justify such widespread use of pyramidal (or hierarchical) 
holding companies in this country. Finally, the consequences that this structure has had 
on the performance of groups and on the Italian economic system will be discussed, 
with some insights on future trends. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF CONTROL OF ITALIAN FIRMS 
In the last decade, the characteristics of the different forms of “Capitalism”, also called 
“Systems of Corporate governance”, typical of the main industrialised countries have 
been described in many articles and books. These studies show that there are two 
models facing each other: the Anglo-Saxon model and the German-Japanese model 
(Chandler, 1990; Albert, 1991; Charkham, 1994; etc.). In the former, ownership is 
divided among a large number of shareholders, managers have control of the firms and 
the market for corporate control reallocates the control of firms badly managed through 
hostile take-overs; in the latter, banks and in general financial institutions finance a large 
part of the firms’ investments (through both debt and equity) and for this reason they 
play a large role, directly or through the election of managers, in the management of the 
firms.  
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The Italian case differs from both: in fact in Italy there is no market for corporate control 
developed in the way it is in Anglo-Saxon countries and, due to the previous Banking 
Law, banks do not own large shareholdings in industrial companies2. A description of 
the shareholding structure and the company structure of large firms in Italy now follows 
with the purpose of pointing out the main peculiarities of the Italian system of Corporate 
governance. 
(insert here Table 1) 
 
a) The shareholding structure of large Italian firms 
As can be seen in Table 1, whose data regard only stock companies which are based in 
four different countries, foreign shareholders represent the smallest percentage among 
the countries considered, public administration (Government and local authorities) the 
highest, institutional investors the second lowest, financial institutions the lowest, firms 
the second lowest (however data concerning the United Kingdom tend to underestimate 
inter-group shareholdings because of the accounting standards used) and finally families 
represent by far the highest percentage. So from these data, which obviously describe 
the situation only at an aggregate level, we know that Italian firms have a peculiar 
distribution of shareholdings: in fact they nearly always have the lowest or the highest 
percentage for each category of shareholders3. 
Moreover, from data regarding the ratio of issued shares owned by the main 
shareholder, we learn that large Italian firms are also characterised by a larger 
concentration of the ownership structure. From a comparison at international level, it 
results that in the first 500 Italian (not financial) firms per revenue the main shareholder 
has in more than 96% of the cases the control (>51% of the shares) of the firm; the same 
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percentage in the first 500 (not financial) companies in France is equal to 55%, in the 
first 400 in Germany to 66% and in the first 470 in the United Kingdom to 5.3%. Using 
data regarding the United States and Japan, it results that Italian firms have a larger 
concentration of shares in the hands of the main shareholder also compared to these 
countries (Barca et al., 1994). 
In short, large Italian firms are characterised by a greater concentration of shares in the 
hands of the main shareholder and, moreover, this shareholder is, in the majority of the 
cases, a coalition of people belonging to the same family. This datum, which can be 
considered anomalous and strange if judged by international standards, confirms one of 
the main peculiarities of Italian capitalism, i.e. the strong influence of the owner family 
in large-sized firms4. 
These data show that the Italian system of Corporate governance is characterised both 
by a peculiar distribution of shareholdings and by a larger concentration of shares in the 
hands of the main shareholder, but they do not allow us to infer anything about the 
weight of the different ownership structure among large Italian firms. The main limit of 
the data presented is that they do not show the distribution of shareholders for   
homogeneous categories of firms (multinational, family-owned, State-owned, co-
operatives, and so on)5; i.e. from these data it seems that all firms in Italy are controlled 
by one family or coalitions of individuals, which is obviously not the case.  
 
b) The structure of control of large corporate groups in Italy 
A recent study has supplied data which were previously missing and enables us to 
measure the weight of different structures of control among large Italian firms and 
groups (Ravasi, Zattoni, 1997). The study considered all the firms incorporated in Italy 
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in all industries (excluding banking, insurance and financial services) with more than 
100 employees and 300 billion revenue lire in 1995.  
By collecting information through many different sources (published data, economic 
magazines, questionnaires, etc.), the authors were able to reconstruct the ownership 
structure and the corporate structure of almost all the firms analysed. The rule they used 
to assign the “structure of control” to each firm was the ownership of the majority of the 
company’s shares (i.e. >51%). Moreover, because previous studies showed the 
widespread use of holding companies controlling a large number of firms, they decided 
to pass through the corporate veil and consider all the firms controlled by the same 
parent company as one single entity; i.e. they measured the size of corporate groups 
instead of single firms belonging to them. 
The main results of the study, presented in Table 2, show that:  
- large firms incorporated in Italy represent a composite and varied set of structure of  
control, even if three types count for about 90% of the total revenue and employees; 
- there is a strong prevalence of ownership structures characterised by one shareholder 
(one person, the State or one multinational firm) or more shareholders connected by 
family ties controlling the majority of the shares;  
- it is not common to find firms controlled by coalitions, in which two or more 
shareholders (not connected by family ties) share the control of the firms; 
- at the moment in Italy there are no financial and industrial groups as in Japan and 
Germany and we can count only one public company among the largest firms and 
groups of the country. 
In short, these data show that the large firms incorporated in Italy are mainly controlled 
by the main shareholder (the State or a multinational firm) or by more shareholders 
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belonging to the same family. In particular, it is surprising to note that such a large 
amount of groups and firms, equal to 1/3 of total revenue and more than 1/3 of total 
employees, are still controlled by single families, in many cases represented by the 
founder or heirs.  
(insert here Table 2 and its Legend) 
A partial explanation to this situation is that Italian firms tend to do business in 
traditional and specialised industries, i.e. they tend to create firms in industries in which 
the controlling shareholder must not realise high investments right from the start (Porter, 
1990; Dematté, Corbetta, 1993). Moreover, after the birth of the firm, Italian 
entrepreneurs prefer to create group of companies (with or without equity ties) that work 
together in order to produce the final product, instead of increasing the size of their 
firms too much and too soon (Lorenzoni, 1990).  
Nevertheless, if this reasoning explains why the Italian economy is dominated by small 
and medium-sized enterprises controlled by one family, it does not clarify why many 
large companies in the country are also still controlled by one family or by a coalition of 
families. Moreover, data not presented here show that single families tend to maintain 
the control not only of firms and groups operating in traditional or specialised industries 
(as for example textiles, furnishing, shoes, mechanical, etc.), but also of firms operating 
in scale intensive or scale-based industries (as for example the production of 
automobiles and trucks, white goods, steel, food, etc.) where it is important to grow 
through a stable and high rate of investment (in R&D, physical assets, marketing, etc.) 
over a long time period6. In order to find a solution to this puzzle, the next paragraph 
will describe the typical company structure of large Italian firms.  
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THE COMPANY STRUCTURE OF LARGE ITALIAN GROUPS 
Some characteristics of Italian corporate groups help to explain why so many large-sized 
firms are still controlled by one single family. Large Italian groups are characterised by a 
pyramidal structure at the head of which there is a holding company, that is the 
managing centre of all the group’s activities. Between the holding company and the 
operating firms, there is usually a number of sub-holdings with different characteristics 
and purposes.  
In particular, the number of levels and the ratio of shares owned by the parent company 
in the sub-holdings seem to depend, among other things, on the amount of funds 
necessary to pursue the development and the competitive advantage of firms belonging 
to the group on the one hand, and, on the other, on funds made available by the 
controlling family. In order to solve the conflicting requirements of businesses and 
family, large private Italian groups use different techniques such as: a) creating many 
levels of subsidiaries between the holding and the operating companies (stock 
pyramiding effect); b) listing the securities of many companies belonging to the group; 
c) issuing shares without (or with limited) voting rights; d) making large use of debt for 
financing the assets; e) setting up mutual shareholdings with other groups. All these 
variables are strictly connected to one another, i.e. they constitute a system whose aim is 
to allow the main shareholder of the holding company to maintain the control of a large 
amount of assets. There now follows a brief description of all these characteristics. 
 
a) The stock pyramiding effect 
The stock pyramiding is an old technique (in fact it was used at the end of the last 
century by American railway companies) that allows controlling shareholders to control 
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the largest possible number of firms (i.e. amount of assets) with the lowest amount of 
money (Clemens, 1950; Hilferding, 1968). In order to understand how this mechanism 
works, we hypothesise that: 1) one shareholder wants to maintain certain control of 
some assets, incorporated in company A, minimising his personal investment; 2) these 
assets have a total value of, say, $1,000; 3) all the firms are equally financed by equity 
and debt (50% debt and 50% equity). In these circumstances, if the firm that 
incorporates these assets (company A) is directly controlled by the main shareholder, 
this person should invest 51% of the equity of this firm, i.e. $260 (about 51% of 500), in 
order to maintain control of the company. Suppose now this shareholder creates a new 
company (company B), with assets for $260 financed through debt ($130) and equity 
($130), to which he sells his shareholding in company A. If company B is a financial 
firm without any other assets than the majority shareholding in company A (having a 
value of $260), the main shareholder can now control the assets investing only a quarter 
of the money ($70, about 51% of 130), i.e. the amount necessary to control 51% of the 
equity of company B. In general, the higher the number of subsidiaries created, the 
lower the investment the controlling shareholder needs to make to maintain control of 
the assets: with three levels, $18 will suffice; with four, $5 only, and so on (see Table 
3).  
This mechanism is also more powerful, i.e. a smaller amount of money is enough to 
control the assets, if: 1) the shareholders of the holding company control the firms at any 
level with less than 51% of the shares; 2) the companies issue shares without (or with 
limited) voting rights; 3) there are mutual shareholdings between firms at different 
levels7; 4) the firms have a high leverage. In short, diluting the investments in shares of 
non-controlling shareholders in many companies and concentrating the ones of 
 9 
controlling families at the top allows the largest shareholders of the holding company to 
control a large number of firms (i.e. a large amount of assets) with a small investment in 
shares in the top company8. 
Obviously, this mechanism works only if the controlling shareholder succeeds in 
convincing a large number of savers to buy shares in firms belonging to the group. This 
means that top company managers should be able to obtain a profit high enough to 
reward (through dividends and capital gains) the minority shareholders involved in the 
firms of the group. Regarding this point, research with data on Italian groups with listed 
companies has shown that the separation between controlling and minority shareholders 
is low: in fact, on average, for each unit of equity of the holding company the 
controlling shareholders are able to collect only one and a half units from shareholders 
involved in the financing of other firms belonging to the same group. However, a further 
analysis has shown that this average is misleading because if State-owned groups and 
banks hardly ever use this mechanism, family-controlled groups are able to multiply the 
unit of capital invested in the holding company by eight9. A good example of pyramidal 
structure is Pirelli group, whose structure is presented in Figure 110.  
(insert here Table 3 and Figure 1) 
 
b) Listing the securities of many companies belonging to the same group 
During the past decades, and particularly during the peaks of the stock-exchange, large 
corporate groups listed many companies under their control. These listings had two 
financial benefits for the controlling family: an immediate flow of capital due to the sale 
of a large amount of shares and the possibility to collect funds in the future both through 
the selling of shares not necessary for the control and through capital increasing. 
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Moreover the listing of so many companies of the same group gave controlling 
shareholders the possibility to solve financial crises in some of the group’s firms or 
businesses through capital increase in subsidiaries with good economic performance.  
In Table 4, data regarding the gross capitalisation of main corporate groups in absolute 
terms and the percentage on the total capitalisation of the Italian stock-exchange are 
given. The data show that during the last fifteen years, even with some differences due 
to the listing of new companies and the exit of others, the importance of the main groups 
on the value of the market has been very high and stable; in particular the first corporate 
group per capitalisation counts for more than 1/5 of the market, the first three groups for 
half of the market and the first ten groups for about 80% of the total capitalisation. The 
first ten groups per capitalisation controlled 47 firms with listed shares, with a minimum 
of zero to a maximum of 16, at the end of 1996. 
(insert here Table 4) 
 
c) Issuing shares without or with limited voting rights 
Another legal device used by owner families to collect funds without losing the control 
of their group is represented by the issuing of shares without voting rights (saving 
shares) or with limited voting rights (preferred shares). This device can be used 
profitably almost exclusively by listed companies, because if the controlling group 
wants external shareholders to buy these stocks, the shares should be easily tradable. 
Moreover, the law allows only listed companies to issue saving shares and in any case 
shares with limited voting rights cannot be issued for an amount higher than the value of 
the shares with full voting rights (ordinary shares).  
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In the ‘80s many groups took advantage of this opportunity, increasing the capital of 
listed companies through the issue of non-voting shares. As can be seen in Table 5, the 
nominal value of preferred and saving shares increased in the ‘80s reaching 21.6% of 
the nominal value of all listed shares by the end of 1988; since then things have changed 
and in June 1997 the same percentage had decreased to 11.0%. The reason for this fall is 
that this technique does not seems to satisfy completely the interests of either the 
controlling family (because of the higher rate of dividends due to these shares in 
exchange for the limitations on voting rights) or the external shareholders (because the 
value of these stocks is generally much lower than that of shares with full voting rights).  
(insert here Table 5) 
 
d) High leverage  
Italian companies are characterised by a higher ratio of debt to capital compared to firms 
located in other countries. This empirical evidence is explained by many reasons: 1) 
firms with large debts have fiscal advantages because interest is deductible from tax and 
dividends are not11; 2) in some cases the controlling shareholders prefer to finance the 
firms through new debt, buying long-term bonds issued by the firms themselves, 
because this option allows them to get taxes relief on personal income; 3) increasing the 
debt (within limits) enables controlling shareholders both to finance all the required 
investments and to maintain control of the firm. During the last few decades this ratio 
has improved: it was particularly high during the ‘70s, when equity was on average 
equal to 17% of the total investments of the firms, but then in the ‘80s it rose to 27% 
and in the ‘90s it has reached 30% (Mediobanca, 1996). 
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A large part of the debt consists of loans from banking and financial institutions, which 
therefore play an important role in financing Italian firms. However a financial structure 
with high leverage is very fragile, especially when it involves holding companies (which 
receive money through flows of dividends); for this reason in the last decades more than 
one group has collapsed or has been forced to sell different assets in order to maintain  
control of its remaining businesses. Almost all the large groups that today are controlled 
by a coalition of banks and financial institutions are groups previously controlled by one 
family that collapsed for financial reasons. 
 
e) Mutual inter-group shareholdings 
Large Italian groups tend to create a web of mutual shareholdings among themselves 
that constitutes one of their main peculiarities. These equity ties are both one-way and 
two-way, sometimes they represent portfolio investments, more often they help 
guarantee control of the group. They are minority shareholdings that represent a 
consistent investment and that, if aggregated, can also be equal or greater than the 
controlling shareholdings of the owner family. 
In order to give an idea of the entity of the phenomenon it is sufficient to remember that 
the capitalisation of inter-group equity links at the end of 1987 was equal to 7,404 
billion lire (equal to 6.4% of the gross capitalisation of the stock-exchange). About one 
third of these inter-group shareholdings were held by Mediobanca, a merchant bank that, 
in the continuous search for funds by the controlling family, has been playing the 
conclusive role of hidden director able to favour the control held by the existing 
majority (Brioschi, Buzzacchi, Colombo, 1990). These investments in shares are 
characterised by continuous adjustments that seem to be governed by the will to help 
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create a stable group of controlling shareholders. Some relevant facts bring us to this 
interpretation: 1) 95% of the inter-group equity links at the end of 1987 were constituted 
by investments in common shares (with full voting rights); 2) during the ‘80s, 
shareholdings in subsidiaries in which the owner family had obtained a majority control 
were turned into shareholdings in holding companies in which the controlling family 
owned less than 51% of the shares with voting rights; 3) the financial alliance between 
the controlling family and friend groups tends to be formalised in voting trust, which 
binds shareholders to vote in the same way at the shareholders’ meetings, or blocking 
trust, which prevents shareholders from selling the shares to other investors12. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Large Italian companies tend to be structured as pyramidal groups made up of many 
levels of firms, not always controlled with at least 51% of the shares. One of the main 
peculiarities of Italian groups is that the first levels from the top are usually represented 
by listed companies in which the main shareholder (the owner family) maintains the 
control only thanks to the decisive help of shares held by other friend companies. In 
general, we can conclude that the characteristics of the first levels of Italian groups are 
aimed at assuring the control of the largest amount of assets with the smallest amount of 
funds. Then, under these levels, the structure of Italian corporate groups tends to be 
more similar to the structure of groups localised in other countries, i.e. under the third or 
fourth level from the top we find not-listed companies with responsibility in some 
industry or business and controlled with a very high percentage of equity. That being 
stated, in the remaining part of the article some comments will be made on the 
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consequences that these pyramidal structures, and the stability of control they allow, can 
have on the performance of large Italian firms. 
According to scholars, the stability of ownership represents a positive aspect of a 
Corporate governance system because large and stable shareholders can prevent firms 
from being managed towards myopic objectives such as, for instance, short-term 
profitability. Many authors have in fact criticised the investment policy adopted in the 
past decades by Anglo-Saxon public companies because it was too sensitive to current 
returns and it stressed current stock price over long-term corporate value (Porter, 1992). 
Moreover, scholars have also underlined that strong shareholders are able to control the 
boardroom, so that managers cannot pursue personal aims, deviating from the objective 
of maximising the shareholders’ value.  
On the other hand, the majority control of firms belonging to the group prevents 
potential raiders from attempting hostile take-over, even when there is the feeling that 
the firm can be better managed by someone else. Pyramidal structure like the one 
adopted by Italian groups creates potential risks for minority shareholders because 
controlling shareholders of the holding company can be tempted to increase the wealth 
of firms in which they have the greatest ratio of equity (i.e. of dividends) through the 
mechanism of transfer price applied on inter-group trade (regarding goods, services or 
loans).  
Moreover, in the past decades, due to the financial fragility of pyramidal structure 
events such as sudden and unexpected economic crises in some businesses frequently 
emerged, forcing firms to find a large amount of funds in a short amount of time to 
solve the financial problems which had arisen. The solution to these problems was 
usually for the owner family to list some of the group’s firms on the stock- exchange 
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(usually the ones with good economic and financial performances) and to modify the 
structure of the group (mergers, break-ups, capital increases, and so on). In other cases, 
they left the control of some of the group’s companies, if not of all of them, in other 
hands. 
Finally, the fragility of the financial structure of large Italian groups, due to the wish of 
controlling shareholders to maintain control of a large amount of assets, has probably in 
some circumstances damaged the competitive position of some controlled businesses. In 
some cases the owner family may have preferred to maintain control of the group taking 
further financial risks, instead of realising the investments (in R&D, marketing, physical 
assets, and so on) required by the competitive challenge. The financial fragility of this 
structure could have also helped prevent the development of many capital intensive and 
high technology firms owned by private shareholders. Compared to these pyramidal 
structures, both public companies, typical of Anglo Saxon capitalism, and industrial and 
financial groups, typical of the German and Japanese model, have superior 
characteristics in terms of ability to finance growth through periodical and frequent 
increases in capital. In the past decades, the State, in some circumstances, filled this gap 
creating giant firms operating in scale intensive or science based industries (such as 
steel, public utilities, defence, and so on), but this option will not be possible in the 
future because of the strict financial budget the Government is imposing on State-owned 
groups. 
Before concluding, here are some comments on future trends. In the next years the 
pyramidal structures that characterise large corporate groups are likely to become 
simpler and the ownership structure of holding companies at the top may become more 
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fragmented among coalitions of different shareholders. This trend is suggested by many 
signs:  
a) the increasing awareness of businessmen that in a global financial market, pyramidal 
structures including many companies with listed shares can divert large amount of funds 
from the Italian stock-exchange because they produce a less transparent and efficient 
market, they prevent hostile take-overs and cause a structural conflict of interests 
between majority and minority shareholders13;  
b) the privatisation process is placing giant firms and groups on the stock-exchange 
market; these groups will be controlled by coalitions of different parties such as banks, 
firms, employees, institutional investors, and so on, either for the sales conditions fixed 
by the Government or for the large amount of funds required to control the board;  
c) the new Banking Law has allowed banks and other financial institutions to take  
control of industrial firms; until now they used this possibility mainly for saving 
industrial groups in financial crisis, but when the current merger and acquisition phase 
in the financial industry is complete, they could become important shareholders in many 
industrial companies;  
d) due to the sharp decrease in interest rates on bonds, in the next decades mutual and 
pension funds will attract a larger proportion of savings that will be invested mainly in 
listed companies; 
e) the globalisation process and the birth of the European Monetary Union will force 
many firms to grow in order not to lose competitive advantage; this means that 
controlling shareholders who do not have enough funds to finance the investments 
required to be competitive on the market should involve external investors and 
consequently jeopardise their control. 
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Today it is difficult to foresee if the ownership structure of large Italian firms and 
groups will become more similar to Anglo-Saxon public companies or to German 
industrial and financial groups. Probably, considering the long time period required to 
change cultural, political, and economic institutions (North, 1994), Italian corporate 
groups will continue to differ from both in some particular features. 
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Table 1: Owners of shares in public companies in France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom in 1991 (data in percentage on the total). 
 
Shareholders 
France 
 
Germany Italy United 
Kingdom 
Families 27.0 16.9 50.8 13.3 
Firms 49.1 39.5 24.0 7.5 
Financial Institutions 6.6 11.8 6.3 19.4 
Institutional investors 3.4 13.2 3.9 36.3 
Public administration 4.2 5.5 8.2 1.9 
Foreign investors 9.7 13.1 6.8 21.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Cannari et al., 1994.. 
 
 
Table 2: Ownership structure of large firms incorporated in Italy at the end of  1995 
 
 
Controlled by ... 
Number 
of 
groups 
Total 
revenue  
in £ it. 
Revenue in % 
on the total 
Total 
employees 
Employees in 
% on the 
total 
Coalition of banking and 
financial institutions 
3 11,733,159 1.66% 38,068 2,24% 
Coalition of families 20 29,956,682 4.24% 79,174 4.66% 
Coalition of different subjects 7 4,348,085 0.62% 9,568 0.56% 
Co-operatives  16 14,524,484 2.06% 35,988 2.12% 
Family 142 240,375,249 34.05% 665,270 39.16% 
Joint venture 9 15,462,851 2.19% 36,483 2.15% 
Foreign multinational firm 133 173,777,998 24.61% 288,003 16.95% 
State or local authorities 8 207,351,405 29.37% 531,109 31.27% 
Other forms 2 805,704 0.11% 1,601 0.09% 
Not classifiable 12 7,714,168 1.09% 13,459 0.79% 
Total 352 706,049,785 100.00% 1,698,723 100.00% 
Source: elaboration on data of Ravasi, Zattoni, 1997. 
 
Legend: 
Structure of  control Subjects controlling the firm 
Coalition of banking and financial institutions A large number of banking and financial institutions 
Coalition of families Two or more persons belonging to different families 
Coalition of different subjects Coalition among families, banking and financial 
institutions, managers, industrial firms, etc. 
Co-operatives  Large number of shareholders that are consumers, 
employees, etc. 
Family One or more persons belonging to the same family 
Joint venture Two firms with the same amount of shares (50%) 
Foreign multinational firm One multinational firm with the headquarters 
located in a foreign country. 
State or local authorities State or some local authority 
Other forms It is a residual group including one public company 
and one firm controlled by a foundation 
Not classifiable Firms for which it has not been possible to identify 
the shareholders 
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Table 3: The stock pyramiding effect 
Company Assets Equity Controlling 
shareholder’ 
equity 
Minority 
shareholder’ 
equity 
Debt 
A 1,000 500 260 240 500 
B 260 130 70 60 130 
C 70 35 18 17 35 
D 18 9 5 4 9 
 
 
 
Table 4: Gross capitalisation of Italian large corporate groups (in value and in 
percentage on the total capitalisation of the stock-exchange)  
 End 1980 End 1987 End 1996 
 
Gross capitalisation 
regarding: 
Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total 
- first group 6,445 26.07 29,910 20.39 96,674 25.03 
- first three groups 11,486 46.47 77,139 52.59 200,451 51.9 
- first five groups 14,808 59.91 105,102 71.65 248,213 64.27 
- first ten groups 19,237 77.83 122,096 83.24 296,828 76.86 
Source: data regarding 1980 and 1987 are taken from Brioschi, Buzzacchi, Colombo, 1990; data 
regarding 1996 are our elaboration on Italian stock-exchange data.  
 
 
Table 5: Nominal value (in billion £ it.) of common shares versus preferred and saving 
shares of companies listed on the Italian stock-exchange  
 End 1979 End 1983 End 1988 July 1997 
 Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total Value in 
billion £ it. 
% on total 
Common 
shares 
7,496 95.8 15,109 89.3 30,131 78.4 97,440 89.0 
Preferred and 
saving shares 
329 4.2 1,810 10.7 8,305 21.6 12,060 11.0 
Total 7,825 100.0 16,919 100.0 38,436 100.0 109,500 100.0 
Source: data regarding 1979, 1983 and 1988 are taken from Brioschi, Buzzacchi, Colombo, 1990; data 
regarding 1997 are our elaboration on data of Indici e dati (Mediobanca, 1997).  
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 Fin.P.
Pirelli & C.
Societe
Internationale
Pirelli
Pirelli cavi Pirelli tyre
holding
12,45%
Pirelli & C.
Luxembourg
Other shareholders in the syndicate
Mediobanca 11,82%
HdP   6,01%
SAI   5,86%
Ass. Generali   5,30%
RAS   3,00%
CIR   2,00%
100,0%
41,73%
Pirelli Spa
51,12%
Pirelli
Partecipazioni
100,0%
100,0% 93,6%
3,66%
Figure 1: The simplified company structure of Pirelli group in 1997
Source: R&S, 1997.
= Listed companies
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1 On the concept of organizational isomorphism applied to corporate groups in East Asia see: Orrù, 
Biggart, Hamilton, 1991. 
2 The new Banking Law (“Testo Unico delle Leggi in materia bancaria e creditizia”, August 27th,1993) is 
based on the principle of de-specialisation, in the sense that grants to all financial institutions equal 
opportunities to develop activities at brief or medium-long term. In particular, banking institutions can, 
within certain limits, grant funds at medium-long term, issue bonds and buy industrial shares. 
3 Even if the privatization process diluted the ratio of shares in the hands of public administration and the 
new Banking Law (that allows financial institutions to buy shares in manufacturing firms) has created the 
opportunity to increase the percentage of shares owned by banks, official statistics say that, at the moment, 
the situation in Italy has only changed marginally from that described in table 1. 
4 Chandler showed that also in the United Kingdom many families maintained for a long time, and 
sometimes still have, a controlling position on founded firms; for this reason, he called the British 
experience “Personal capitalism” (Chandler, 1990). In any case, their shareholdings in large-sized firms 
are rarely so relevant as in Italy, where families maintain control of the majority of the shares in giant 
holding companies. As suggested by one referee, this difference could also be due to the fact that Italy is 
still behind in the evolution of the industrial and economic system; in fact a ten time larger percentage of 
Anglo-Saxon companies were privately controlled in 1900 than today. 
5 In Italy we can identify six typical models of “institutional structure” of firms: independent small and 
medium enterprises (SME), groups of SME, groups of firms owned by the State, large private groups, 
subsidiaries of multinationals, co-operatives. Each model has its own characteristics in terms of players 
(shareholders, lenders, managers, and so on), contributions given to the firm (money, technical ability, 
managerial ability, and so on) and rewards received in exchange (money, status, prestige, and so on) 
(Zattoni, 1994). On the concept of “institutional structure of the firm” see: Airoldi, 1995. 
6 The classification of industries here accepted is the one developed by Pavitt (Pavitt, 1984). 
7 Italian groups do not very often use mutual shareholdings between the parent company and its 
subsidiaries, because the law imposes limits and restrictions to this kind of ties between firms. 
8 This case of separation between ownership and control is completely different from the one described by 
Berle and Means many years ago (Berle, Means, 1932). In that case, speaking about American giant 
public companies, they showed that these firms were governed by managers (without shares in the 
company) who were able to pursue their interests deviating from the objective of maximizing 
shareholders’ value. Large Italian corporate groups present, instead, a case in which owners maintain 
control of the firm with a small amount of shares; in these circumstances the problems of Corporate 
governance regard mainly the risk of shareholders of the parent company pursuing their interests 
damaging those of minority shareholders of the subsidiaries. 
9 Also among family-controlled groups there is an high variability of cases; in particular, the highest value 
has been measured for Carlo De Benedetti and the Agnelli family with respectively a multiplier equal to 
24 and 16 (Barca et al., 1994). 
10 Recently the shareholders of the group have decided to merge some financial subsidiaries with the 
objective of creating more value and increasing the transparency for the market. 
11 In order to reverse this phenomenon, the Government has recently changed fiscal rules lowering tax 
burdens on equity and increasing those on debt. Due to this law, it is reasonable to suppose that in the next 
few years Italian firms will have a better financial structure. 
12 At the end of 1996 there were 56 voting and/or blocking trusts in listed companies that counted for 
about 30% of the total value of the Italian stock-exchange. The average shareholding of the pact is higher 
than 50% (Consob, 1997). 
13 Recently, the Corporate governance debate has captured the interests of politicians and the Italian 
Government. After a long period of study, the Draghi Commission produced a document in 1998 that has 
become law and that sets out new rules for firms and financial institutions working on financial markets. 
